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NOTES
TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY: COMPETING
MOTIONS IN THE SHADOW OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Emily M. Dowling*
Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is a procedural mechanism by
which the claims of hundreds or even thousands of alleged victims of
the same or similar set of wrongs are consolidated before a single
federal judge. 1 In other words, it is “something of a cross between the
Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the
Godfather movies.” 2 MDL criticism is legion. In more other words,
MDLs are a “proverbial ‘black hole,’ taking in cases with virtually no
hope of fair and efficient resolution,” 3 latent with “[s]ystemic
pathologies” that call parties’ consent to settlement into question, 4 a
land where “the ordinary Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
sporadically, if at all.” 5 The list of criticisms goes on, and it is growing.
Recent publicity surrounding In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation

* My endless thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his instruction on the value of
process and patient guidance while I developed this Note. I also thank Professors Stephanie
Barclay, Samuel L. Bray, and Dr. Felicia Caponigri for their advice on legal scholarship, and
the staff of Volume 97 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their blood, sweat, and tears. All
errors are my own.
1 Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2015, at 36, 37;
see Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State
and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 47 (2007).
2 Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation,
Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015).
3 George M. Fleming & Jessica Kasischke, MDL Practice: Avoiding the Black Hole, 56 S.
TEX. L. REV. 71, 72 (2014).
4 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 71
(2015).
5 Bexis, The Need for Real MDL Rules Will Only Grow More Acute, DRUG & DEVICE L.
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2019/04/the-need-for-real-mdlrules-will-only-grow-more-acute.html [https://perma.cc/47Q8-VP4T].
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(the “Opioid MDL”), 6 an MDL in the Northern District of Ohio
involving thousands of claims against opioid manufacturers and
distributors for their alleged involvement in the opioid crisis, 7 has
triggered a fresh wave of scholarship and public interest in
multidistrict litigation. What all this discourse misses is what lies just
beyond the boundary of the aggregate proceeding—an issue silently
stewing in the transferor courts that, by the time it reaches the Opioid
MDL and comes to fruition, is at once at its most detrimental and most
hidden by the haze of the MDL frenzy. This Note seeks to change that.
All over the country, plaintiffs are filing actions in state court,
alleging boilerplate state law claims against opioid manufacturers and
distributors, only to end up stuck in the Opioid MDL—a federal
forum—where some have remained stranded for nearly four years.
The typical procedure is this: After a case is filed in state court,
defendants remove the action to federal court and contemporaneously
file a notice of potential tag-along action with the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML” or “Panel”). The Panel is tasked with
determining whether to transfer and consolidate the action with an
ongoing MDL, and the notice alerts the Panel to a case that might meet
the transfer criteria. If the case shares “one or more common
questions of fact” with the ongoing MDL—a notoriously “low bar”—
then the Panel will issue a conditional transfer order tagging the action
for transfer and consolidation. 8 Assuming plaintiff wishes to remain in
the state court forum of her initial choosing, plaintiff files a motion to
remand the action back to state court before the action is transferred
on the ground that federal subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.
Immediately after, and sometimes before an action is even tagged by
the Panel, defendants request a stay of proceedings. 9
The motion to stay is a request that the judge sit tight and refrain
from addressing plaintiff’s motion to remand 10 given the claimed
6 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio filed Dec. 8,
2017).
7 See Transfer Order, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 1375
(J.P.M.L. 2017) (transferring cases to the Northern District of Ohio).
8 Morris A. Ratner, Foreword, “MDL Problems” – A Brief Introduction and Summary, 37
REV. LITIG. 123, 123 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018)).
9 This practice has become so commonplace that some law firms have put out
practice guides detailing how best to achieve the ultimate goal of making it to the MDL.
See, e.g., Brandon D. Cox & Courtenay Youngblood Jalics, Navigating the Muddy Waters of an
MDL: Strategies to Get (and Keep) Your Case in Federal Court, DRI: THE VOICE (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.tuckerellis.com/news_publications/publications-759
[https://perma.cc
/C4UL-6VGR].
10 More formally, a stay of proceedings “is defined as the act of stopping or arresting
a judicial proceeding, by the order of a court or judge. It is a suspension of a case . . . .” 1A
C.J.S. Actions § 308, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2021) (internal footnote omitted).
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likelihood that the action will soon be transferred to an ongoing MDL
where all pending motions can be resolved by the MDL judge. The
initial district judge must now grapple with dueling motions to remand
or to stay, all in the shadow of likely MDL consolidation. If the judge
grants the stay, the action will remain on the federal docket where the
Panel is free to sweep plaintiff off to some faraway MDL forum. The
JPML has made clear that it will neither assess jurisdictional issues nor
block a transfer when remands are left unresolved.
More often than not, judges are granting the stay without regard
for the merits of the remand or notwithstanding the recognition of a
potentially fatal jurisdictional flaw. The JPML transfers plaintiff’s
action to a faraway MDL proceeding, and her remand is put on hold
until the MDL judge eventually resolves it. Her remand might remain
on hold for years. Plaintiff’s claim is now one of potentially thousands—her remand motion likely one of tens of thousands of
motions—pending before the single federal judge presiding over the
MDL. And if plaintiff has the misfortune of ending up in the Opioid
MDL, a substantial wait is certain. There, her remand will be met with
the jurisdictional brick wall of a moratorium on all remand filings.
On December 14, 2017, the judge presiding over the Opioid MDL
issued a “moratorium on all substantive filings” except those expressly
authorized therein. 11 That moratorium prohibits nongovernmental
parties from making motions regarding requests that their cause be
remanded back to state court. As of September 9, 2021, nearly four
years later, the moratorium still stands. 12
What this means for our unlucky plaintiff, and any number of
cases currently pending before the Opioid MDL, is that three judicial
entities—the transferor judge, the JPML, and the MDL judge—have
declined to address her jurisdictional argument. It means that any
number of cases currently pending before the Opioid MDL may have
spent nearly four years stranded before a federal court that does not
have the power to ultimately decide the case and issue relief.
The harm of what will hereinafter be referred to as “the Opioid
outcome,” that is, the stranding of nonfederal cases in a federal MDL,

11 Response in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Motion for Remand Procedure
at 1, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2020), ECF
No. 3604.
12 This assertion is based on a review of publicly available court orders. See MDL 2804
National Prescription Opiate Litigation, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE N. DIST. OF OHIO, https://
www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 [https://perma.cc/FD8F-HDBB]. At least one court
filing from a related case recently transferred and consolidated with the Opioid MDL
confirms the persistence of the moratorium as of July 28, 2021. See, e.g., Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion to Remand at 11, Erie Cnty. Med. Ctr. Corp. v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 21-cv-00826 (W.D.N.Y. July 28, 2021).

NDL208_DOWLING_02_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

900

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

2/23/2022 6:57 PM

[VOL. 97:2

reaches every corner of the legal system. A plaintiff’s Due Process
rights are offended when she is stripped of her choice of forum and
the opportunity to have her jurisdictional argument heard in a
reasonable amount of time in the more local federal court her cause
was originally removed to. It means that while she waits, she will have
to comply with and bear the cost of an MDL judge’s pretrial orders.
Adding insult to injury is the risk that repeat defendants are taking
strategic advantage of the opportunity to remove actions on the most
loose of jurisdictional bases with an eye toward burying a claim in an
MDL. This means more actions are removed to federal court, which
means more removals, remands, and stays are added to the already
overworked transferor judges’ to-do lists. It means more cases aggregated in MDLs and more motion practice taxing the already
overworked MDL judge. It means the MDL judge must resolve a
jurisdictional issue that could have been resolved earlier, on a less
crowded docket. It means the squandering of judicial resources.
This outcome sounds in doctrinal disaster for anyone familiar with
the understanding of subject-matter jurisdiction as the foremost
limitation on the power of a court. At the Supreme Court, in “law
school classrooms, courtroom chambers, congressional buildings, and
law offices,” the term jurisdiction is “bandied about” as the ultimate
limitation on judicial power. 13 Decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence insisting that subject-matter jurisdiction is judicial power, that
in every case, the “first and fundamental question is that of
jurisdiction” 14 and that “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause” 15 would seem to outright prohibit the
Opioid outcome from occurring. Without jurisdiction, how can three
federal judicial entities (the transferor judge, the JPML, and the
transferee judge) have kept hold of an action for so long?
Enter, inherent authority. Inherent authority enables courts “to
control and direct the conduct of civil litigation without any express
authorization in a constitution, statute, or written rule of court.” 16
Inherent authority is what authorizes courts to take steps toward
assessing their own jurisdiction before it is verified, like by ordering
jurisdictional discovery. It is what allows courts to circumvent the issue
of subject-matter jurisdiction altogether in favor of some alternative

13 Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 620 (2017).
14 Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
15 Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 N.W. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2001)
(quoting Ex parte McCardle (McCardle II), 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
16 Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Inherent and Supervisory Power, 54 GA. L. REV. 411, 428 n.68
(2020) (quoting Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1995)).
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issue, like personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens. 17 Inherent
authority is the space between jurisdiction and power which might
legitimize each step toward the Opioid outcome—which might
transform what looks like judicial failure into the unfortunate reality
of modern litigation.
But answering the question of whether it does is no simple task.
The inherent power is notoriously broad and amorphous. 18 Questions
surrounding its source and scope have “never been answered
satisfactorily” 19 and have “bedeviled commentators for years.” 20 As a
result, “there is no clear standard establishing when courts may
legitimately invoke their inherent powers.” 21 What is more, the doctrine on inherent authority’s ability to manage the process of ongoing
litigation and the power’s relationship to positive procedural law are
the least developed and most convoluted subspecies of inherent
authority doctrine. 22
This Note attempts to bring just enough clarity to inherent
authority doctrine to answer the question of whether and at what point
something went wrong—whether any power beyond the blurry
boundaries of inherent authority was exerted, or any of its convoluted
doctrine misapplied—to produce the Opioid outcome. It contributes
to the literature by (i) calling much needed attention to the possibility
that any number of cases transferred to a multidistrict proceeding are
improperly positioned on the federal docket—an issue not yet
addressed by scholarship to date; 23 (ii) unearthing and investigating
17 See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts,
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 54 (2001).
18 See Cong. Rsch. Serv., Art.III.S1.1.1.2.1.1 Inherent Powers of Federal Courts: Procedural
Rules, CONST. ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII_S1_1_1
_2_1_1/#ALDF_00003611 [https://perma.cc/H8P9-RLAB].
19 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738 (2001) (“Federal judges exercise massive powers that
have not been granted specifically by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. What is the
source and scope of such inherent authority? This fundamental constitutional question has
never been answered satisfactorily.”). Blurring the bounds of inherent authority further is
the issue of how inherent authority interacts with positive procedural law, an issue that
remains “perhaps the most vexing question today concerning the limits on a court’s
inherent authority to manage civil litigation.” Meador, supra note 16, at 1817.
20 James C. Francis IV & Eric P. Mandel, Limits on Limiting Inherent Authority: Rule 37(e)
and the Power to Sanction, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 613, 619 (2016) (quoting Eash v. Riggins
Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
21 Joseph J. Anclien, Broader is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
SURV. AM. L. 37, 41–42 (2008). The Supreme Court itself has confessed that it “has never
precisely delineated the outer boundaries of a district court’s inherent powers.” Dietz v.
Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016).
22 See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
23 Only one piece could be identified that briefly discusses the jurisdictional issues
posed by the Opioid MDL, or any MDL for that matter. That article does not mention the
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the district court decisions and current approaches to inherent
authority that have produced the Opioid outcome; (iii) concluding
that those approaches are inconsistent with inherent authority
doctrine; and (iv) proposing a solution that both corrects a systemic
misapplication of law at the district court level and has the potential to
prevent the Opioid result from ever accruing. Its central argument is
that the opportunity and obligation to avoid the Opioid outcome arises
at the point of the stay.
For district judges facing dueling motions to remand or stay an
action pending likely MDL transfer, the threshold question before the
court is which motion to address first. Should the judge resolve the
motion to remand or the request to stay? This threshold question will
hereinafter be referred to as “the ordering inquiry.”
At present, many district judges are wholly overlooking the
ordering inquiry. Failing to recognize it as a discrete and threshold
issue, judges de facto resolve the stay first and apply the doctrine which
would typically control—broad discretion. When judges do recognize
the ordering inquiry, attempts to resolve it vary. But in every scenario,
the stay and the factors used to decide it overshadow and ultimately
decide the ordering inquiry. Given the wide breadth of discretion that
governs stays, this means that requests to stay are overwhelmingly
granted notwithstanding the existence of a potentially fatal jurisdictional issue that is decidedly left undecided.
This Note argues that the ordering inquiry must be identified and
treated as the discrete and threshold issue that it is. As such, the
appropriate doctrine for resolving the ordering inquiry is not the same
doctrine which would apply to a motion to stay. Rather, this Note
argues that what must guide the ordering inquiry is Supreme Court
jurisprudence on jurisdictional resequencing—a body of caselaw not
yet utilized even by the courts that recognize the ordering inquiry as a
separate question from the stay. Jurisdictional resequencing doctrine
is the subset of inherent authority doctrine that allows courts to resolve
certain threshold issues before the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.
removal, remand, and stay process that precedes transfer, and suggests that the only
solution to the MDL purgatory is “lifting the moratorium and beginning a quick, strategic
remand procedure.” Lana Levin, Shelly Sanford & Frank Guerra, When MDL Judges
Overreach: Opioid Cases, Without Jurisdiction, Held in Judicial Purgatory, WATTS GUERRA (June
30, 2020), https://wattsguerra.com/when-mdl-judges-overreach-opioid-cases-withoutjurisdiction-held-in-judicial-purgatory/ [https://perma.cc/TT49-2VHS]. While I do not
disagree that lifting the mortarium may be wise (and possibly required), this Note
undertakes a more thorough investigation of the mechanisms preceding the result and
assesses those mechanisms in search of a doctrinal misstep. Moreover, I recommend an
alternative solution here that resolves the problem when it first arises at the point of the
stay. No literature could be found on the jurisdictional issues posed by the removal,
remand, and stay process preceding MDL transfer.
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Drawing on the work of Professors Idleman and Elliott, this Note
argues that courts exercise the power of “jurisdictional
resequencing” 24 when they choose to address the stay before the
remand, and that the jurisdictional resequencing power cannot
legitimately be exercised to address the stay first. Controlling Supreme
Court jurisprudence, once properly identified and applied, forbids it.
Having reached this conclusion, the Opioid outcome can be avoided
from the outset without the need to resolve related issues regarding
the JPML’s transfer and MDL judge’s moratorium.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a basic overview
of the inherent power, with an emphasis on the interaction between
inherent power and jurisdiction. In Part II, it reintroduces the Opioid
outcome and describes the mechanisms producing it by summarizing
district courts’ varied approaches to resolving competing motions to
remand or stay. In Part III, it identifies the flaws of those approaches
and proposes an alternative solution, applying jurisdictional
resequencing doctrine to the ordering inquiry and concluding that the
remand must go first.
I.

FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER

The judicial power is generally understood to at least encompass
“the power to decide, in accordance with law, who should prevail in a
case or controversy.” 25 The power to render that decision “consists of
applying pre-existing law to the facts in a particular case, then
rendering a final, binding judgment.” 26 Yet the Supreme Court has
long recognized that the power of a federal court goes beyond that
core adjudicatory authority of rendering judgment over established
Article III Cases and Controversies. 27 Federal courts possess “inherent
authority” to do something more. 28
How much more—that is, the source and scope of inherent
authority—is a question that has “bedeviled commentators for years.” 29

24 Idleman, supra note 17, at 3.
25 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 816 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment).
26 Pushaw, supra note 19, at 844.
27 Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
324, 334 (2006) (citing Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
1468–73 (1984)).
28 Barrett, supra note 27, at 335.
29 Francis & Mandel, supra note 20, at 619 (quoting Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc.,
757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
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Inherent authority is nowhere precisely defined, 30 and “there is no
clear standard establishing when courts may legitimately invoke their
inherent powers.” 31 At best, “certain general principles reflecting the
current state of the law can be derived” 32 which by no means reflect
calcified, longstanding doctrine.
A. Inherent Authority
Inherent authority is a power deriving from history and necessity 33
that enables courts “to control and direct the conduct of civil litigation
without any express authorization in a constitution, statute, or written
rule of court.” 34 For example, federal courts rely on inherent authority
“to do those things necessary to develop an accurate and relevant
factual record—including such things as managing discovery,
compelling testimony, appointing experts, and excluding and
admitting evidence.” 35 Inherent authority authorizes those actions
because an accurate and relevant factual record is necessary to the
execution of the core judicial function of adjudication. 36 In addition,
inherent authority has long been understood to encompass those
actions necessary to the preservation of the integrity of the court,
enabling courts to thwart abusive or vexatious behavior through the
issuance of sanctions and contempt orders. 37

30 Anclien, supra note 21, at 41–42. The Supreme Court itself has confessed that it
“has never precisely delineated the outer boundaries of a district court’s inherent powers.”
Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016).
31 Anclien, supra note 21, at 41; Pushaw, supra note 19, at 822 (explaining that
inherent authority is “not directly address[ed]” by “[t]he Constitution’s words and
legislative history” and is the outgrowth of “general principles of constitutional structure
and theory and . . . early congressional and judicial precedent”). One oft-cited definition
from Daniel Meador’s influential article on the power describes it as “the power[] possessed
by a court simply because it is a court; it is an authority that inheres in the very nature of a
judicial body and requires no grant of power other than that which creates the court and
gives it jurisdiction.” Meador, supra note 16, at 1805.
32 Francis & Mandel, supra note 20, at 643.
33 Idleman, supra note 17, at 49–51 (“[T]here are essentially two benchmarks—
history and necessity—by which one can measure the legitimate recognition of inherent
powers.”); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (“These powers are
‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” (quoting
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962))).
34 Meador, supra note 16, at 1805.
35 Barrett, supra note 27, at 335 (citing Pushaw, supra note 19, at 742).
36 Id. at 334–35.
37 See Meador, supra note 16, at 1805–06.
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While early invocations of the power described it as limited by
necessity in a strict sense (i.e., indispensability), 38 the necessity
‘requirement’ is doubtlessly a “phantom constraint.” 39 It has never
been “mentioned, much less applied, . . . in the context of inherent
procedural authority.” 40
Instead, courts often employ inherent authority whenever it might
be deemed “highly useful in the pursuit of a just result.” 41 When an
invocation of inherent authority is challenged, its legitimacy is tested
using a mix of history—analogizing to previously approved of exercises
of inherent authority—and necessity in a loose sense (i.e.,
convenience), with the weight given each factor, and the possibility
that each could be sufficient standing alone, left unclear. 42 In practice,
that lack of clarity translates to broad discretion. 43 As Professor Pushaw
explains: “[F]ederal judges have repeatedly cited ‘inherent powers’ as
a catch-phrase to rationalize a wide range of actions that are not
essential to (indeed, that often seem antithetical to) the proper
exercise of judicial authority.” 44
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure almost never limit the
breadth of this authority. Affording district judges more discretion

38 Pushaw, supra note 19, at 784–85, n. 256 (“[A]lthough federal judges are ‘limited’
by Article III, they can exercise those ancillary powers indispensable to fulfilling their
enumerated ones (and develop a common law regarding those powers).”).
39 Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 879 (2008); see also
Anclien, supra note 21, at 41–42 (“The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is schizophrenic: it
sometimes states that inherent powers are available only when they are indispensable to the
discharge of the judicial power, yet it often authorizes their use in less pressing situations.”).
40 Barrett, supra note 39, at 882. In Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s
influential 2008 article on procedural authority, Justice Barrett concludes that “the
procedures [the Supreme Court] has approved as falling within [inherent] authority go far
beyond what is strictly necessary to the decision of cases. To the extent that federal courts
possess inherent procedural authority, no necessity limit applies to it.” Id. (internal
footnote omitted). The necessity limit, she says, functions only as a guide for the judiciary’s
authority to respond to contempt and otherwise impose sanctions without edging too near
“Congress’s exclusive power to define federal criminal jurisdiction.” Id. at 881.
41 Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
42 Idleman, supra note 17, at 49–51; see also Benjamin H. Barton, An Article I Theory of
the Inherent Powers of the Federal Courts, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“The nature of the
inherent powers of federal courts—whether they are constitutional or not, whether
Congress can curtail some or all of them, and how far they extend—has bedeviled courts
and commentators for years.” (internal footnote omitted)); Idleman, supra note 17, at 4–5
(“[U]ndertheorized and analytically undeveloped nature of the doctrine renders its future
application uncertain, thereby inviting unpredictability, inconsistency, and even abuse.”);
Pushaw, supra note 19, at 739 (“The Court has never explained how the Constitution
simultaneously limits federal courts (especially as compared to Congress), yet authorizes
them to exercise broad and virtually unreviewable inherent authority.”).
43 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
44 Pushaw, supra note 19, at 738.
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over procedure was one of the primary aims of the Federal Rules. 45 In
light of this, the Court has repeatedly approved of the use of inherent
authority to supplement the Federal Rules so long as the rules are not
interpreted “to prohibit the particular exercise of inherent
authority.” 46 It is exceedingly rare that a rule is interpreted as
prohibiting a particular exercise of inherent authority. 47 Instead, the
rule is treated as either inapplicable or applicable but nevertheless
permissive of the continued invocation of inherent authority as a
supplemental source of procedural power. 48
If a rule is interpreted to explicitly prohibit a particular exercise
of inherent authority, decades’ worth of unresolved and
underdeveloped doctrine come into play. Both in academic discourse
and across Supreme Court jurisprudence, there is a lack of consensus
over Congress’s power to control the use of inherent authority. 49 What
is more, much of that dialogue is inapposite to inherent authority’s use
for case management.
[T]he overwhelming majority of cases dealing with inherent
judicial authority are those asserting either a semi-punitive power
or the power to control those who serve the court. By comparison,
the cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized an inherent
power to prescribe procedural rules or otherwise manage the
process of litigation are relatively few. 50

As a consequence, “[t]he relationship between written procedural
rules and inherent judicial authority is perhaps the most vexing
question today concerning the limits on a court’s inherent authority to
manage civil litigation.” 51 At this point, “[t]he analytical confusion
surrounding claims of nonexpress judicial authority, including
45 See id. at 763 n.122 (“The reformers who led the movement for uniform Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure successfully focused on enlarging the discretion of federal
judges . . . .”).
46 Meador, supra note 16, at 1817.
47 Inherent authority is off the table only when a federal rule is “clearly applicable” to
the particular factual circumstance giving rise to the court’s inclination to rely on inherent
authority, see Barton, supra note 42, at 47–49, and when the rule clearly “mandate[s] a
specific procedure to the exclusion of others.” Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within
a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 311, 320 (2010) (quoting G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
148 (1985).
48 See Jordan, supra note 47, at 316–17 nn.25–26; Barton, supra note 42, at 53
(confirming that, in cases in which a congressional act applies and the Court nonetheless
allows an exercise of inherent authority, “the Court is always careful to note that the
decision either occupies space untrammeled by Congress or that congressional intent to
displace inherent authority is unclear”).
49 Francis & Mandel, supra note 20, at 619.
50 Barrett, supra note 39, at 846.
51 Meador, supra note 16, at 1817.
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authority over procedure, . . . has persisted for so long that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to untangle.” 52
The lack of doctrinal certainty surrounding the potential for
written rules to limit inherent authority, the historical practice of
avoiding a conflict with the rules, and the broad discretion afforded by
the low bar of history and pseudo-necessity has led to increased
reliance on and an expansion of inherent authority. To list only a
sampling, inherent authority now empowers courts to:
•
“order[] consolidation of cases during or before trial”; 53
•
hear a motion in limine; 54
•
“appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges
in the performance of specific judicial duties”; 55
•
order jurisdictional discovery to establish the court’s
jurisdiction over the matter; 56
•
stay proceedings pending the resolution of a separate cause
raising related issues; 57
•
“rescind an order discharging a jury and recall the jurors for
further deliberations where the court discovers an error in
the jury’s verdict”; 58
•
“issue orders and sanction noncompliance with those
orders”; 59
•
“regulate the conduct of the members of the bar” by
disbarment, suspension from practice, or reprimand
(including monetary sanctions) “for abuse of the judicial
process”; 60
•
“dismiss a case for failure to prosecute”; 61 and

52 Barrett, supra note 39, at 851.
53 Anclien, supra note 21, at 44–45.
54 Cong. Rsch. Serv., supra note 18.
55 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
56 S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 489, 497 (2010) (“Jurisdictional discovery is not explicitly discussed in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, the practice of taking limited discovery to establish
whether jurisdiction is proper has been judicially created through reliance on (1) the broad
principles of discovery established in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and
expanded upon in subsequent years and (2) courts’ inherent power to establish their own
jurisdiction.”).
57 Cong. Rsch. Serv., supra note 18; see also Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254
(1936).
58 Francis & Mandel, supra note 20, at 642 (citing Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885,
1892, 1897 (2016)).
59 Strong, supra note 56, at 504.
60 Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561–64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
61 Id. at 561.
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•

“declare[] attorneys who choose to be absent from docket
call ‘ready for trial,’ even though this may lead ineluctably to
the entry of a default judgment.” 62
The action of relevance here is the stay of proceedings. The
seminal case recognizing a court’s inherent authority to stay
proceedings is Landis v. North American Co. 63 In Landis, the respondent
sued to enjoin enforcement of a statute on the ground that it was
The petitioner successfully moved to stay
unconstitutional. 64
proceedings pending decision in another suit to restrain enforcement
of that same statute until that parallel suit either rendered decision on
the validity of the act or was terminated. 65 The issue before the
Supreme Court was the lower court’s power to stay proceedings. 66 The
Court upheld the lower court’s power to issue the stay, holding that
“the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 67
Since Landis, the broad discretion courts possess to “control the
progress of the cause so as to maintain the orderly processes of justice”
has been reaffirmed time and again. 68 Nowadays, “[a] variety of
circumstances may justify a district court stay,” 69 with factors like the
balance of hardships, and economy of time, money, and effort guiding
the stay inquiry. 70 While commonly issued “pending the resolution of
a related case in another court,” “[a] stay sometimes is authorized

62 Id. (quoting Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc, 728 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir.
1984)). This list is not comprehensive and, given the ongoing lack of clarity surrounding
the doctrine, is likely to lengthen.
63 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
64 Id. at 249.
65 Id. at 250, 253.
66 Id. at 249.
67 Id. at 254. Though it had the power to issue the stay, the Court ultimately held that
the lower court had exceeded the limits of its discretion regarding the duration of the stay.
Id. at 258. It reversed judgment and remanded the case. Id. at 259.
68 Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382 (1935); see, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 706–07 (1997) (affirming district court’s “broad discretion to stay proceedings as
an incident to its power to control its own docket” but holding that court abused that
discretion); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (discussing power to stay
proceedings in the context of post-conviction relief). “Inherent in the district court’s power
to control the disposition of civil matters appearing on its docket is the power to stay
proceedings when judicial economy or other interests so require.” Barker v. Kane, 149 F.
Supp. 3d 521, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (discussing power to stay civil proceeding pending
resolution of related criminal proceeding).
69 Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc’ns, Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000).
70 Id. at 1265.
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simply as a means of controlling the district court’s docket and of
managing cases before [it].” 71
Inherent authority’s versatility and breadth have led to increased
reliance on inherent authority in the context of complex civil
litigation. Because complex cases, like multidistrict proceedings and
class actions, often pose unique challenges that traditional procedural
and remedial frameworks are ill-equipped to manage, judges presiding
over complex cases are particularly inclined to craft ad hoc rules that
bring order to the docket. 72 To do so, they rely on inherent
authority—citing it as a one-size-fits-all justification to “ensure the
orderly, expeditious, and efficient administration of justice.” 73 Judges
in complex cases routinely rely on inherent authority to issue case
management orders, appoint a counsel structure for aggregated
proceedings, take an active role in supervising discovery, and require
that parties attend pretrial conferences. 74
The expansion of inherent authority in the context of complex
civil litigation presents at least two unique difficulties. First, the stakes
are high. An attempt to bring order to a complex case often has
outcome-determinative effects that result in a judge taking on a less
passive role than the American civil justice system is accustomed to. 75
In an effort to regain control over mass disputes, judges are
“shed[ding] their . . . passive role of acting only at the behest of
parties.” 76 This raises concerns over Due Process impartiality and
fairness, 77 and separation of powers. 78 If the critics’ concerns are
warranted and reliance on inherent authority comes at a great cost to
the civil justice system, then the need for meaningful guidance and
Id. at 1264.
See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES, 291–94 (2d ed. 2002).
73 Pushaw, supra note 19, at 760.
74 Id. at 763.
75 TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 72, at 8 (“Many of the purported solutions to
complex litigation have required the abandonment of the passive, reactive judge of
adversarial theory . . . .”).
76 Pushaw, supra note 19, at 762 (criticizing modern exercises of inherent authority as
going beyond the proper scope of the judicial power).
77 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (criticizing
modern case management); TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 72, at 289 (“The
combination of broad inherent authority and a broad array of techniques to resolve
litigation creates the risk that justice will vary substantially from courtroom to courtroom.”);
see also supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. But see Meador, supra note 16, at 1819–20
(praising federal judges’ efforts to improve efficiency through broad use of inherent
powers).
78 See Pushaw, supra note 19, 783–84 (“[The Court] has never explained how its
massive expansion of inherent authority can logically coexist with other basic constitutional
principles it has long recognized.”).
71
72
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limitation whenever inherent authority is at play is crucial. Second,
given the complexity and underdevelopment of inherent authority
doctrine, particularly in light of the dubious interaction between
inherent powers and positive procedural law, finding meaningful
guidance and limitation is exceptionally difficult. Absent support from
the academic community, district court judges are not likely to limit
themselves when it comes to a power that puts almost anything on the
table and promises greater control over litigants and cases that might
otherwise spiral.
That is not to say that inherent authority is always employed as a
means toward the end of expanding judicial power. On the other side
of the ledger, inherent authority is a crucial tool for “ensuring that
federal courts act within their limited and enumerated powers.” 79 In
this way, inherent authority permits an expansion of the means by
which a court may reach a restraining end. 80 To achieve that end,
inherent power authorizes actions which are necessary to “assess
whether a particular dispute is, among other things, a justiciable case
or controversy involving proper subject matter.” 81 When inherent
authority works toward a restraining end, it “operate[s] in the absence
of verified subject-matter jurisdiction.” 82 The next part of this Note
more closely investigates the relationship between inherent authority
and jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction and Restraining Inherent Authority
Because federal courts possess limited and enumerated powers,
their jurisdiction is limited. 83 But what it means to be without
jurisdiction is not so cut and dry. 84 At minimum, the absence of

79 Idleman, supra note 17, at 59 (emphasis added).
80 See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV.
725, 742–45 (2009). Though Elliott does not discuss inherent authority by name, her
central thesis is that Justice Ginsburg’s use of inherent authority in Ruhrgas was an exercise
of judicial restraint, and that judicial restraint can explain what look like expansions of
judicial power via inherent authority. Id.
81 Idleman, supra note 17, at 59.
82 Id. at 56.
83 Id. at 42 (“The federal judiciary, like the federal government as a whole, ‘is one of
delegated and limited powers.’ What this means for the federal courts is that they ‘are not
courts of general jurisdiction,’ but rather of limited jurisdiction, and ‘have only the power
that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.’” (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas.
144, 149 (C.C. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); and then quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)).
84 Id. at 56.
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jurisdiction is not equivalent to the absence of judicial power. 85
Inherent authority is conclusive evidence of this—it allows a court to
take limited action in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. 86 But
this has not stopped the Supreme Court and lower federal courts from
repeatedly using the terms “power” and “jurisdiction”
interchangeably. 87
The characterization of jurisdiction as power is the result of the
misleadingly strong language in cases establishing the “jurisdiction
first” approach. 88 The jurisdiction first approach is the Supreme
Court’s historical and (at least rhetorically) continued insistence that
federal courts address and resolve issues of subject-matter jurisdiction
before doing just about anything else. 89 Professor Fitzgerald explains
that
[a]s early as 1868, and as recently as 1999, the Supreme Court has
always declared that subject matter jurisdiction . . . is an absolutely
necessary precondition to the exercise of judicial power by Article
III courts: “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in
any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it
ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 90

The jurisdiction first approach is the heart of Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment. 91 In Steel Co., the Court repudiated the practice
of hypothetical jurisdiction, holding that an issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction (in that case, standing) may not be ignored in favor of an
easier resolution on the merits which would itself result in dismissal. 92
85 Id. at 47 (noting jurisdiction is “[m]ore than a mere synonym” for the judicial
power).
86 Id. at 57.
87 Dodson, supra note 13, at 620–21. As Professor Dodson explains, the three most
common ways that jurisdiction is characterized are “jurisdiction as basic power or authority,
jurisdiction as a defined set of effects, and jurisdiction as positive law.” Id. at 626–27. As
recently as 2015 the Court invoked all three characterizations, putting clarification of the
term on hold for the time being. Id. at 632–33 (citing United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct.
1625 (2015)).
88 Fitzgerald, supra note 15, at 1207; see also Special Invs., Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., 360
F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing the jurisdiction first rule).
89 See Fitzgerald, supra note 15, at 1207; Dodson, supra note 13, at 623–24 (tracing the
Court’s treatment of jurisdiction and providing examples of the Court’s strong language
when describing jurisdiction as power). “[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits
of the judicial power of the United States, is inflexible and without exception . . . . On every
writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction . . . .” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S.
379, 382 (1884)).
90 Fitzgerald, supra note 15, at 1207 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ex parte
McCardle (McCardle II) 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)).
91 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
92 Id. at 101–02, 109–10.
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To do so, Justice Scalia said, would be to “offend[] fundamental
principles of separation of powers.” 93 In so reasoning, Justice Scalia
reaffirmed the jurisdiction first approach through the equation of
jurisdiction and power: “For a court to pronounce upon the [merits]
. . . when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court
to act ultra vires.” 94 Over and over, the Court has reinforced the
absolute nature of the jurisdictional inquiry: it is the threshold question
in every federal case. 95
But as inherent authority has expanded, the jurisdiction first
approach has yielded. 96 This yielding is traceable to two subsets of
inherent authority caselaw—both examples of inherent authority in a
restraining sense.
First, the Supreme Court has recognized a “limited power over
This
the parties to decide whether jurisdiction is proper.” 97
authority—often called “jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction” 98—is an example of inherent power as a means to a
restraining end. 99 Jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction allows a federal
court to engage in a broad range of actions in service of its
jurisdictional inquiry. Courts may “issue orders and sanction noncompliance with those orders,” 100 order jurisdictional discovery, 101 stay
proceedings pending the resolution of a separate cause raising related
issues, 102 pass on the constitutionality and applicability of statutes
purportedly stripping the court of its jurisdiction, 103 and relatedly,
93 Id. at 94.
94 Id. at 101–02 (emphasis added).
95 See Idleman, supra note 17, at 24; Dodson, supra note 13, at 623.
96 See Sherri S. Rich, The Yielding Jurisdictional Hierarchy: Removal Proceedings After
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., FED. LAW., Aug. 2004, at 34, 35.
97 Strong, supra note 56, at 504 (2010).
98 See, e.g., id.; United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (“[I]t is familiar law that
a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”). Note how this
phrasing appears to treat the first use of ‘jurisdiction’ as synonymous with power.
99 Idleman, supra note 17, at 57 (“[T]his protojurisdictional form of jurisdiction is
ordinarily conceptualized as an inherent power, and rightly so given the absence of an
empowering constitutional or statutory provision.”).
100 Strong, supra note 56, at 504.
101 Id. at 497 (“Jurisdictional discovery is not explicitly discussed in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Instead, the practice of taking limited discovery to establish whether
jurisdiction is proper has been judicially created through reliance on (1) the broad
principles of discovery established in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and
expanded upon in subsequent years and (2) courts’ inherent power to establish their own
jurisdiction.”).
102 Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
103 Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2113 n.39 (2009) (“[R]esolving the ‘threshold’
jurisdictional question in jurisdiction-stripping cases necessarily involves resolving
constitutional challenges to statutes purportedly precluding jurisdiction.”); see also, e.g.,
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“decide whether the affected litigants have substantive rights before
deciding whether the physical or substantive preclusion of judicial
review is constitutional,” 104 all in service of ultimately assessing whether
the court has jurisdiction to issue relief.
The second category of actions a court may take before
establishing its subject-matter jurisdiction are those related to the
ordering of non-merits based issues. This body of caselaw empowers a
court to resolve some alternative threshold issue before and in lieu of
a challenge to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, “sidestep[ping]
entirely the subject-matter jurisdiction question.” 105 In other words, it
empowers a departure from the jurisdiction first approach. The power
to depart from the jurisdiction first approach is what Professor
Idleman calls the “jurisdictional resequencing” power. 106 As Idleman
elucidates, “the prerogative of a court to resequence threshold
inquiries is indeed a form of power, particularly when exercised against
a background understanding, rooted in both precedent and theory,
that courts should address subject-matter jurisdiction first.” 107 The
jurisdictional resequencing power is distinguishable from the power
exerted when a choice is made either way and when the case is
ultimately dismissed. 108 In other words, power is exerted when the
question is asked—when the option to depart from the default of
jurisdiction first is opened.
That opening is not always available. In the first case of the
jurisdictional resequencing trilogy of Steel Co., Sinochem, and
Ruhrgas, 109 the Supreme Court established that jurisdictional
resequencing is not available to reach and resolve even an easily
resolved merits-based issue which would itself result in dismissal.
The only two Supreme Court-recognized threshold grounds upon
which a court may resolve and dismiss a case before and without

Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]s an Article III court,
we have inherent jurisdiction ‘to determine whether [a] jurisdictional bar applies.’”
(quoting Latu v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 2004)).
104 Vladeck, supra note 103, at 2113.
105 Idleman, supra note 17, at 3.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 40.
108 Id. at 40–45.
109 Fla. Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 859 F.3d 1306, 1321
(11th Cir. 2017) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“The Supreme Court has addressed the federal
courts’ discretion to choose between available nonmerits grounds for dismissal on three
occasions since 1998 in the so-called ‘jurisdictional-sequencing trilogy’ of Steel Co. v. Citizens
for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Company, 526 U.S. 574, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999), and Sinochem
International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 127 S.Ct. 1184,
167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007).”).
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addressing its subject-matter jurisdiction are (i) personal jurisdiction
and (ii) forum non conveniens. In Sinochem International Co. v.
Malaysia International Shipping Corp., the Court held that federal courts
may dismiss a case for forum non conveniens before deciding an issue
of personal jurisdiction. 110 In so holding, it made clear that its ruling
applied to subject-matter jurisdiction as well. 111 Similarly, in Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., the Court permitted the dismissal of an action
for lack of personal jurisdiction before an issue of the court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction was addressed. 112
Lower courts and legal academics have further developed the
guidelines governing the jurisdictional resequencing power. In Special
Investments Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., the Ninth Circuit limited Ruhrgas’s
applicability to cases where deciding the personal jurisdiction issue
would result in the end of the case. 113 Moreover, Professors Idleman
and Heather Elliott each discern certain criteria from the jurisdictional
resequencing trilogy for when resequencing is available.
According to Idleman, whether a court may exercise the
jurisdictional resequencing power
consists of two inquiries. The first is whether a court, for purposes
of resequencing, may consider a given threshold issue equivalent to
subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. If not, then the analysis is
at an end: the court simply may not address the issue prior to these
core jurisdictional questions. If the threshold issue can be
considered equivalent, however, then a second inquiry examines
whether the court should in fact resequence the issue and address
it prior to subject-matter or personal jurisdiction in light of the
specific legal and factual circumstances of the case. 114

As for Idleman’s first prong, an issue is equivalent to a core
jurisdictional question when it is both an essential and constitutional
aspect of an exercise of judicial power. 115 An issue is essential when it
is “at the very least . . . a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial
power.” 116 An issue is constitutional when it “possesses a palpable
constitutional dimension.” 117
Unlike Idleman, Elliott proposes a less formulaic approach to
resequencing that does not require the precise kind of constitutional
equivalence Idleman does. To Elliott, resequencing is primarily a
doctrine of restraint that permits a court to “avoid treading on the
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007).
Id.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999).
Special Invs., Inc. v. Aero Air, Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 994–95 (9th Cir. 2004).
Idleman, supra note 17, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.

NDL208_DOWLING_02_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

2/23/2022 6:57 PM

COMPETING MOTIONS AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

915

boundary of its power, when it would lack jurisdiction for another
threshold reason.” 118 Elliott argues that any complicated issue which
requires a court to “determine the limits of its own power within our
tripartite system of government”—be it a statutory or constitutional
question of subject-matter jurisdiction—may be avoided through
resequencing, so long as “no answer to that question is needed to
dismiss the case.” 119
For the purposes of this Note, the points where Idleman and
Elliott agree are crucial. First and foremost, both recognize that a
departure from the jurisdiction first approach requires the invocation
of the jurisdictional resequencing power. Second, each reinforce that
the alternative issue must also be a prerequisite to the court’s power
over the case—the alternative issue must also have the potential to
result in dismissal on some power-based grounds. As the final part of
this Note explains, these points will prove exceptionally useful for
prevention of the Opioid outcome. But first, the next part of this Note
reintroduces the Opioid outcome by investigating the mechanisms and
current approaches to competing motions that have produced it.
II.

COMPETING MOTIONS AND THE OPIOID MDL

The Opioid MDL is a massive multidistrict proceeding currently
pending in the Northern District of Ohio, encompassing more than
3036 pending actions. 120 The cases center around allegations that “(1)
manufacturers of prescription opioid medications overstated the
benefits and downplayed the risks of the use of their opioids and
aggressively marketed . . . these drugs to physicians, and/or (2)
distributors failed to monitor, detect, investigate, refuse and report
suspicious orders of prescription opiates,” thereby contributing to the
nation’s opioid crisis. 121 In the early stages of the litigation, the Opioid
MDL court attempted to bring some order to the monstrous
proceeding by issuing a case management order that put a
“moratorium on all [substantive] filings” except those expressly
authorized therein. 122 Excluded from authorization were motions

118 Elliott, supra note 80, at 743.
119 Id. at 743–44.
120 MDL Statistics Report, Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by Actions Pending, JPML
(Aug. 13, 2021), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets
_By_Actions_Pending-August-13-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/H58W-KRC5].
121 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
122 Minutes of Teleconference and Scheduling Order at 4, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N. D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2017), ECF No. 4. That order was extended
on January 11, 2018. Minutes of Initial Pretrial Conference at 2, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 17-md-02804 (N. D. Ohio Jan 11, 2018), ECF No. 70.
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regarding remands. 123 The court solidifies its remand prohibition in a
separate order “Regarding Remands,” which clarifies that “the
moratorium on all substantive filings shall include all motions to
remand.” 124 Since issuing these orders, Judge Polster has requested that
the JPML remand select cases to other federal courts for strategic
reasons alone. 125 There has been no mention of remanding actions to
state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
While Judge Polster’s moratorium has yet to face a direct
challenge, the Sixth Circuit has weighed in on its permissibility in a
related decision. In In re CVS Pharmacy, Inc., the Sixth Circuit granted
Opioid MDL petitioners’ writ of mandamus, reversing Judge Polster’s
order allowing for certain claims to be amended after the deadline
mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 126 In that same writ,
petitioners challenged a portion of the moratorium—its prohibition
on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. But because the Sixth Circuit granted
relief on separate grounds, the challenge was not decided. However,
the language of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion casts doubt over the
legitimacy of the moratorium: “Civil Rule 12(b) states that ‘a party may
assert’ the defenses enumerated therein ‘by motion,’ which means that
the district court may not refuse to adjudicate motions properly filed
under that Rule.” 127 Shortly after the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, Judge
Polster issued an order permitting defendants to “file individual
motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.” 128 That order did not
alter the moratorium as to plaintiffs’ remands—as of September 9,
2021, the moratorium stands. 129
Notwithstanding Judge Polster’s ban on remands, the JPML
persists in refusing to address jurisdictional issues at the point of
transfer. In a recent transfer order, the Panel responded to the parties’
transfer opposition as follows: “All parties opposing transfer in seven
123 Order Regarding Remands at 1, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 17-md-02804
(N. D. Ohio Feb. 16, 2018), ECF No. 130.
124 Id. (emphasis added).
125 See Request for Expedited Hearing at 4–5, 7, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig.,
MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 20, 2019), ECF No. 6242. The Court adopted a “hub-andspoke” model for its remand suggestions. Under this model, the MDL proceedings would
remain the hub of pre-trial proceedings aimed at achieving global settlement, while the
“spokes”—the selected cases that would proceed to trial in other districts—informed the
hub’s settlement negotiations. The Court’s order made clear that this strategy was adopted
in furtherance of settlement. See id. at 5 (“[T]he Court asked the parties to submit
proposals regarding limited, strategic remands of specific cases, in order to allow other
federal judges to help resolve specific portions of the Opiate MDL in parallel.”).
126 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d 838, 846 (6th Cir. 2020).
127 Id. at 846.
128 Track Three Case Management Order at 2, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No.
17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio June 8, 2020), ECF No. 3329 (emphasis omitted).
129 Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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actions argue principally that federal jurisdiction is lacking over their
cases. But opposition to transfer challenging the propriety of federal
jurisdiction is insufficient to warrant vacating conditional transfer
orders covering otherwise factually-related cases.” 130
With a moratorium poised to persist indefinitely and an
unwavering a-jurisdiction stance from the JPML, the pressure and
opportunity to avoid the Opioid outcome is on transferee judges’
treatment of the dueling motions to remand or stay that precede MDL
transfer. As the following details, courts have yet to come to a
consensus over how to treat these motions.
A. Treatment of Competing Motions
The unique procedural posture that precedes MDL transfer often
presents district judges with competing motions to remand for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction or stay proceedings.
Presumably
empowered by the broad and virtually unbounded managerial
authority granted them via inherent authority, very few judges identify
or adequately assess the ordering inquiry—the threshold question of
which motion to address first. Instead, either the stay is de facto
chosen and resolved first or, when the ordering inquiry is identified as
a discrete issue, the ordering inquiry is resolved through the
application of stay-like doctrine—discretionary considerations that
weigh the balance of hardships, and economy of time, money and
effort. 131
One illustrative example is Erie County Medical Center Corp. v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. On May 11, 2021, the Erie plaintiffs filed a
complaint in New York state court alleging tort claims like negligence
and nuisance for the defendants’ alleged contribution to the opioid
epidemic. 132 On July 19, 2021, the defense removed the case to federal
court. 133 On July 26, the JPML was notified of the potential Opioid tagalong case, and issued a conditional transfer order on July 29. 134 The
day prior, on July 28, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to remand
to state court. 135 Six days later, on August 4, the defense filed a motion
130 Transfer Order at 2, In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L.
Oct. 3, 2018), ECF No. 2640.
131 See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
132 Exhibit A at 2, Erie Cnty. Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 21-cv00826 (W.D.N.Y. July 19, 2021), ECF No. 1.
133 Notice of Removal at 2, Erie Cnty. Med. Ctr. Corp., No. 21-cv-00826 (W.D.N.Y. July
19, 2021), ECF No. 1.
134 Text Order, Erie Cnty. Med. Ctr. Corp., No. 21-cv-00826 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2021),
ECF No. 37.
135 Motion to Remand to State Court, Erie Cnty. Med. Ctr. Corp., No. 21-cv-00826
(W.D.N.Y. Jul. 28, 2021), ECF No. 7.
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to stay proceedings pending a final decision from the JPML on
whether to transfer the case. 136 On August 25, in a paragraph-long text
order, the judge presiding over the case granted the stay. 137 “After
reviewing the parties’ materials in support of and opposition to the
motion to stay,” the judge reasoned that a stay would “promote[]
judicial economy and consistency” and that the “hardship [to
Defendants]” if the stay were denied would “outweigh[] any prejudice
that [the stay] could potentially inure to [Plaintiffs].” 138 Even though
plaintiffs’ motion to remand was filed first, the court did not so much
as mention the threshold issue of which motion to decide first,
jurisdiction or the jurisdiction first approach. It appears to have wholly
overlooked the ordering inquiry, de facto choosing to resolve the stay
first.
In another case tagged for and eventually transferred to the
Opioid MDL, City of Santa Fe, when faced with dueling motions, the
court responded by recognizing but nonetheless conflating the distinct
inquiries of ordering and staying. In its order granting the stay, the
court acknowledged its “discretion [to] stay proceedings pending an
MDL transfer without first ruling on a pending motion to remand.” 139
But this very acknowledgment reveals the court’s failure to separate the
ordering inquiry as distinct from the issue of the stay—immediately
after acknowledging its discretion to stay proceedings before deciding
the remand motion, the court states: “[T]he district court’s ‘power to
stay “is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort
for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”’” 140 The court offered no
discussion as to why it chose to order the stay before the remand, or
whether it considered the issue of ordering beyond its assertion that it
possessed the power to grant the stay first. Moreover, the court vaguely
referenced the remand’s eventual resolution by the Opioid MDL as a
reason for granting the stay, as opposed to a reason for addressing the
stay first. The court did not address the jurisdictional arguments or
the jurisdiction first approach. 141
These examples are only two of the countless decisions completely
overlooking the ordering inquiry or conflating it with the issue of the

136 Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Transfer to Multidistrict Litigation, Erie Cnty.
Med. Ctr. Corp., No. 21-cv-00826 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2021), ECF No. 23.
137 Text Order, supra note 134.
138 Id.
139 City of Santa Fe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., Civ. No. 19-1105, 2020 WL 671008, at *2
(D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2020) (emphasis added).
140 Id. (quoting Pace v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. CIV 04-1356, 2005 WL 6125457, at *1
(D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2005)).
141 See id. at *2–3.
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stay. 142 To make matters worse, as more and more courts conflate the
issues and grant the stay, the weight of authority on stays while
jurisdictional issues are pending becomes a reason in and of itself for
federal courts to “defer ruling on pending motions to remand . . . until
after the [JPML] has transferred the case.” 143 Defendants are able to
persuade the court by essentially saying: “follow the crowd, grant the
stay.” Often, courts are successfully persuaded, “stating in relatively
short orders that the judicial cooperation and consistency were their
preeminent concerns.” 144
To be sure, not every court faced with this unique procedural
context skirts the ordering issue altogether. 145 But even when courts
grapple with the ordering issue, even when they ultimately elect to
resolve the remand first, their responses are varied and misguided, and
on the whole evidence a continued reliance on stay-like discretion to
resolve the ordering issue.
For example, many of the courts that successfully recognize the
ordering inquiry as a distinct and threshold issue rely on the three-step
approach originally articulated in Meyers v. Bayer AG (the Meyers
approach) to resolve it. 146 The first step of the Meyers approach is to
give “preliminary scrutiny to the merits of the motion to remand.” 147
142 See Dinwiddie Cnty., Va. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19-CV-242, 2019 WL 2518130,
at *2 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2019) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Seminole Cnty. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CIV-18-372, 2019 WL 1474397, at *1–2 (E.D.
Okla. Apr. 3, 2019) (analyzing the ordering issue by applying stay factors and granting the
stay); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Del. Cnty v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 18-cv-0460, 2018 WL
5307623, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 26, 2018) (same).
143 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Pawnee Cnty. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-CV-459, 2018
WL 5973752, at *2, *3 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 14, 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Little v.
Pfizer, Inc., No. C-14-1177, 2014 WL 1569425, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014) (granting stay
despite noting that “if the JPML does transfer this action, the plaintiff will likely endure
some delay in the adjudication of its remand motion” given the “weight of authority” and
history of courts granting stays despite pending remand motions in similar opioid-related
cases).
144 Dinwiddie Cnty., 2019 WL 2518130, at *2.
145 City of Las Vegas v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19-CV-2128, 2020 WL 223614, at *2
(D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2020) (“The first—and virtually dispositive—issue before the court is which
motion it should consider first: the motion to remand or the motion to stay.”).
146 Meyers v. Bayer AG, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049–53 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
147 Id. at 1049. The Meyers approach has been overwhelmingly adopted by courts
throughout the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Nauheim v. Interpublic Grp. of Cos., Inc., No. 02C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843, at *2, *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003) (applying the Meyers approach,
granting remand and denying stay as moot); Halperin v. Merck, Sharpe & Dohme Corp.,
No. 11 C 9076, 2012 WL 1204728, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2012) (same); Baker v. Air &
Liquid Sys. Corp., Civ. No. 11-8, 2011 WL 499963, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2011) (same);
Hildebrandt v. Johnson & Johnson, Civ. No. 09-863, 2009 WL 3349913, at *2–5 (S.D. Ill.
Oct. 19, 2009) (same); Brown v. Bayer Corp., Civ. No. 09-760, 2009 WL 3152881, at *1–2
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009) (same); Livingston v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., No. 09 C 2611,
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This first step occurs before the court considers whether to grant the
stay. If an initial assessment suggests that federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is lacking, the court should “promptly complete its
consideration” of the motion to remand. 148 If, on the other hand, this
assessment reveals a jurisdictional issue that is notably difficult, “the
court’s second step should be to determine whether identical or
similar jurisdictional issues have been raised in other cases that have
been or may be transferred to the MDL.” 149 Only then, if the issue is
both difficult and duplicative, should the court consider the merits of
the stay. Under the Meyers approach, “if the stay motion is reached at
all,” the Court may still determine that deciding the motion to remand
is the better of the two options. 150
A few decisions that recognize the ordering inquiry but do not
adopt the Meyers approach instead rely on general principles of judicial
economy and decide, as a general rule, whether remands or stays
should be resolved first. For example, in Dunaway v. Purdue Pharma
L.P., a case tagged for consolidation with the Opioid MDL, Judge Aleta
Trauger from the Middle District of Tennessee concluded that
jurisdictional issues should be assessed first. Judge Trauger based the
decision on “the interests of judicial economy” 151 and the risk that
“‘[i]t would be a waste of judicial resources for [a] case to proceed’ in
the federal courts, if, ultimately, a federal court is not ‘the appropriate
court to consider plaintiffs’ claims.’” 152 Decisions like Judge Trauger’s
are a minority when it comes to the Opioid MDL.
The Meyers approach and decisions like that of Judge Trauger in
Dunaway are certainly a step in the right direction, and a far better
response to competing motions than those cases that neglect the
ordering issue altogether. But even these responses suffer numerous
infirmities.

2009 WL 2448804, at *2–7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2009) (same); Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc.
v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 06 C 6852, 2007 WL 604984, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007)
(same); Rutherford v. Merck & Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845–55 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (same);
Board of Trs. of the Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Ill. v. WorldCom, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902–
03 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (applying the Meyers approach).
148 Board of Trs. of the Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Ill., 244 F. Supp. 2d at 902–03 (quoting Meyers,
143 F. Supp. 2d at 1049).
149 Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
150 Id.
151 Dunaway v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 391 F. Supp. 3d 802, 809 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).
152 Id. (quoting Ohio v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 15-CV-2467, 2015 WL 5117699, at
*3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2015)); see also, e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19CV-2128, 2020 WL 223614, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2020) (agreeing with the reasoning in
Dunaway and addressing the remand first).

NDL208_DOWLING_02_23.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

III.

2/23/2022 6:57 PM

COMPETING MOTIONS AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

921

JURISDICTIONAL RESEQUENCING AND THE ORDERING INQUIRY

Each of the foregoing approaches to competing motions—
whether the ordering inquiry is overlooked, resolved via the case-bycase assessment of the Meyers approach, or subject to the general rule
in Dunaway—fail in consequence, theory, and application.
First is a failure in consequence: none have been uniformly
adopted and none are likely to produce uniformity. Because each of
the foregoing approaches are the creation of district courts, each
carries little precedential weight on its own. However wise any one
decision may be, other district courts are under no obligation to adopt
it. As the number of decisions to grant the stay without regard for the
ordering inquiry or assessment of the jurisdictional issue grows, it will
only become less likely that an overworked district judge understanding themselves to be empowered by the virtually unbounded discretion
of inherent authority will depart from the trend toward staying and
side with Meyers or Dunaway.
Second and foremost is a failure in theory: each of these
approaches apparently fail to appreciate the distinct nature of the
power employed when the ordering decision is made. In other words,
even where the issues of the ordering inquiry and the stay are
recognized as distinct, it is assumed that because ordering and staying
are each an invocation of inherent authority, the same breadth of
discretion is available to resolve each. But just because a remand and
a stay of proceedings are each “independently authorized . . . does not
mean that the power to choose between them is invariably authorized
as well, or that there are no extrinsic, extratextual limitations on the
exercise of that power.” 153
City of Santa Fe and cases like it exemplify the supposition of equal
power in their total blending of the ordering and stay inquiries. As for
the Meyers approach, though it starts with an assessment of jurisdiction,
it nonetheless remains a discretionary, case-by-case assessment
predicated on the availability of the same breadth of discretion that
governs stays. It instructs that courts “should” start with jurisdiction,
not that they must, and permits courts to skirt complicated
jurisdictional issues when doing so would avoid wasting judicial
resources. 154 Dunaway similarly assumes that the same breadth of
discretion governs the ordering inquiry—it is predicated on
considerations of judicial economy and resource conservation, not a
lack of power. 155

153
154
155

Idleman, supra note 17, at 41.
Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
Dunaway, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 809.
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These missteps are understandable given inherent authority’s
historically broad boundaries and frequent focus on judicial economy
and resource conservation. But they nonetheless fail to appreciate that
each invocation of inherent authority may be subject to different
limitations—that the breadth of discretion may vary across invocations.
If the breadth of the discretion for one invocation is narrower, then
what a court ought to do becomes what it must do.
Relatedly, and third, is a failure in application: the ordering
inquiry is not resolvable via the same breadth of discretion that guides
a stay of proceedings. It is, in fact, narrower than the breadth of
discretion applicable to stays. The jurisdictional resequencing trilogy
of Steel Co., Ruhrgas, and Sinochem, once properly identified as
controlling and applied, restricts the discretion guiding the ordering
inquiry to far less broad than the discretion available for the stay. 156
The solution to the Opioid outcome, and the correct approach to
resolving competing motions, is to (i) recognize the ordering inquiry
for what it is—a threshold determination that must be made before the
issue of the stay is reached, and (ii) resolve the ordering inquiry
through the application of jurisdictional resequencing jurisprudence.
Jurisdictional resequencing jurisprudence makes clear that
jurisdiction first is the rule, and a departure requires grounds for an
exception. Thus, once a motion to remand is filed, the court’s first
and foremost duty to the jurisdictional issue is triggered and it must
resolve the jurisdictional issue unless an exception warrants invocation
of the jurisdictional resequencing power. The likelihood of MDL
transfer alone does not change that—there is nothing in Supreme
Court jurisprudence to suggest the inapplicability of the default rule
to this context. To the contrary, it supports the opposite: that a rule of
judicial power governs “an MDL court’s decisions just as it does a
court’s decisions in any other case.” 157 If the rule of law applies with
equal force in an MDL, it presumably applies just as well in its shadow.
In short, the ordering inquiry has already been answered in favor of
the remand by the default rule of jurisdiction first. To reopen the
ordering inquiry in any individual case is to assume the availability of

156 See Fla. Wildlife Fed’n Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 859 F.3d 1306,
1321(11th Cir. 2017) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
157 In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998)); see also id.
at 841 (“Nothing in § 1407 provides any reason to conclude otherwise. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court has made clear, every case in an MDL (other than cases for which there is
a consolidated complaint) retains its individual character. That means an MDL court’s
determination of the parties’ rights in an individual case must be based on the same legal
rules that apply in other cases, as applied to the record in that case alone.”).
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jurisdictional resequencing, and to answer it in favor of the stay is to
exert the jurisdictional resequencing power.
Because choosing to address the stay, or any other issue for that
matter, before the remand requires exertion of the jurisdictional
resequencing power, it is jurisdictional resequencing caselaw which
should control the ordering inquiry. Jurisprudence on stays is inapposite. Jurisdictional resequencing is an exercise of inherent power in a
restraining sense. However broad the inherent power may be, however
broad a court’s discretion to stay proceedings may be, invocation of
that breadth is not warranted in the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction unless it is invoked as a means toward a restraining end.
While exceptional circumstances may warrant a stay of proceedings
pending the resolution of a parallel case raising related jurisdictional
issues, stays granted under those circumstances are in service of the
jurisdictional inquiry. It is improper to assume that either the docketcontrol stay jurisprudence not involving jurisdictional issues or caselaw
permitting a stay of proceedings as an exercise of the court’s
jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction applies to an issue of ordering that
arises when a stay of proceedings competes with a jurisdictional issue
rather than serves the jurisdictional inquiry.
Once applied, jurisdictional resequencing jurisprudence reveals
that resequencing is not available for competing motions to remand
or stay in the shadow of multidistrict litigation. The jurisdictional
resequencing trilogy dictates that the jurisdictional resequencing
power can only be exercised when the alternative issue might also
result in dismissal, and not just for any reason. Dismissal must be on
power grounds—Steel Co. and its progeny support this. 158
A stay pending MDL transfer does the opposite—it keeps the case
in the hands of federal judges, locking the action on the federal docket
so that the Panel may transfer it to another federal forum. The stay
does not result in dismissal, nor does it restrain the federal judiciary to
its Article III power over the matter.
Idleman and Elliot’s frameworks each solidify the conclusion that
the stay cannot precede a remand. Applying Idleman’s framework, the
remand must always be addressed first. A discretionary decision to stay
proceedings is not equivalent to the subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry.
It is neither an essential prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power,
nor is it a matter of constitutional significance. In the realm of stays
requested in the interest of achieving MDL aggregation, the ends
sought to be achieved (judicial consistency, cooperation, and resource
conservation) do not compare in their significance to the end sought
to be achieved by the subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry—ensuring
158

See Fla. Wildlife Fed’n Inc., 859 F.3d at 1321 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
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that the court does not surpass its limited and enumerated powers.
Thus, resequencing is not available under the first prong of Idleman’s
test. 159 The first prong of the test is not discretionary—failure to
establish equivalence puts an end to the inquiry.
Even under Elliott’s more lenient reading of the resequencing
caselaw, resequencing is not available. “[B]oth Ruhrgas and Sinochem
permit resequencing only when the subject-matter jurisdiction
question is appreciably more complicated than the other threshold
question” 160—a question which must provide the court with another
reason that it lacks power over the case and can dismiss it. 161 The issue
of whether to stay proceedings in the context of pending MDL transfer
does not provide the court with an opportunity to dismiss the case.
Thus, resequencing is not available.
CONCLUSION
Process matters. The ordering inquiry, its recognition as a discrete issue, and its resolution via the appropriate doctrine matter to
the litigants who will end up stranded in a massive MDL if district
courts’ approaches do not change. The Opioid MDL provides an
extreme example of this—how judges respond to the ordering inquiry
might determine whether litigants spend years waiting to be sent right
back to where they started. That time, the dignity and autonomy that
is lost when a person’s voice is made one among thousands, the
difference between a realistic prospect of trial and never-ending
settlement negotiations—that matters. This Note attempts to provide
a solution, a solution that may come at the cost of judicial consistency,
cooperation, and the benefits of aggregation. Future scholarship may
conclude that those costs are not worth it, that jurisdictional
resequencing doctrine need not apply or dictate the result proposed
herein. Let there be future scholarship.

159
160
161

See Idleman, supra note 17.
Elliott, supra note 80, at 743 (emphasis added).
See id.

